Most machine-to-machine traffic still authenticates with a long-lived shared secret — a token-shaped string that grants standing authority to whoever holds it. TrustPlane replaces that model at both ends: enforcement that makes every request prove itself, and governance that keeps trust, policy, and revocation operable at fleet scale.
TrustPlane Auth — enforce at the boundary
The runtime authorization layer, free to use. It verifies each machine request locally — caller, intended action, audience, route, freshness, replay — before traffic reaches the protected service, with no per-request dependency on any hosted plane.
TrustPlane Control — govern the fleet
The enterprise governance plane, delivered as managed SaaS — the cockpit for enrollment, trust anchors, signed policy releases, revocation, fleet visibility, audit evidence, and operator access. Available self-hosted as TrustPlane Edge with advanced, tailored capabilities.
flowchart TB
subgraph Control["TrustPlane Control — governance plane"]
TA["Trust anchors + enrollment"] --- PR["Signed policy releases"]
PR --- RV["Revocation + propagation"]
RV --- AU["Audit + fleet visibility"]
end
Control -.->|"signed bundles, trust material"| V
subgraph Runtime["TrustPlane Auth — enforcement plane"]
C["Machine caller<br/>(agent · service · partner client)"] -->|"short-lived passport<br/>+ proof bound to THIS request"| V["Verifier<br/>(adapter · middleware · gateway)"]
V -->|"verified request only"| API["Protected API / tool server"]
end
C -. "passport leaks" .-> X["Attacker cannot reuse it:<br/>expired, wrong audience,<br/>wrong request, already consumed"]
X -.->|denied| V
A caller exchanges the workload identity it already has — SPIFFE/SPIRE, an OIDC/JWT issuer, a local issuer, or a Control-enrolled derived key — for a short-lived passport, signs each request’s transcript, and sends both. The verifier rebuilds the transcript independently, checks the proof against locally held signed trust material, enforces route policy and replay consumption, and allows or denies with a precise reason code. Control keeps that trust material governed: who is enrolled, which policy release is active, what has been revoked, and what the audit record shows.
Platform engineers
Put a verifier in front of a real API and wire trust distribution.
Security engineers
Review the security model, threat coverage, and governance workflows.
Developers
Sign requests from your own services with the SDKs and the CLI.